| There is a recurring debate among Canadian conservatives over what kind of electoral strategy the Conservative Party should pursue. Libertarians and those who are fiscally conservative but socially liberal often argue that social conservatism is hurting the Conservative Party and that the party should generally give up on socially conservative goals and rather project a socially liberal image. In some extreme cases, they even argue that the only thing which prevents the Conservative Party from gaining power is that it has not yet abandoned social conservatism.
Social conservatives of course defend their social conservatism and deny that it is hurting the Conservative Party electorally. Some even argue that there is in Canada a socially conservative silent majority which is only waiting for the Conservative Party's adopting an explicity socially conservative agenda to put it in power. They also often claim that social conservatism is the key to winning the hearts and minds of Canada's growing ethnic minority population. To shed light on this debate, I will look at data from the 2004 Canadian Election Study, as analyzed by five political science professors in a paper presented to the 2005 annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association. It must be pointed out that this paper exclusively analyzes the political landscape outside Québec. Because the political landscape in Québec is still dominated by the federalism-vs.-sovereignty issue, it would have needed its own separate paper. The relevant data from the Canadian Election Study have been collected on two different planes: in the first one, respondents were asked about their fundamental values and beliefs whereas in the second one they were asked about their opinions on specific policies. Thus, the study constructed an index to determine how much a person adhered to socially conservative values based on questions about feeling towards gays, lesbians, feminists and the role of women. Then respondents were asked about their opinions on specific policy issues like abortion and gay marriage. The results of the study with respect to social conservatism are interesting and intriguing. On the one hand, "abortion was simply not a salient factor in people's choice of party" and "the same-sex marriage issue had no impact on the Conservative vote share", which means that the Conservative Party has not been hurt by any particular socially conservative issue. On the other hand, socially liberal voters were reluctant to vote for the Conservatives, which had a considerable negative impact on the party's electoral performance: Overall, socially liberal views prevail: half the sample scored less than -.25 on the social conservatism scale (which ran from -1 to +1). To better understand what these numbers mean, let's look at the official results of the 2004 elections. Out of 10,126,447 votes cast outside Québec, 3,717,959 were cast for the Conservative Party and 3,816,575 were cast for the Liberal Party. In other words, the Conservatives won 36.7 percent of the vote outside Québec whereas the Liberals won 37.7 percent. In the absence of the social conservatism factor, the Conservatives would have won over 40 percent of the vote outside Québec, more than the Liberals. This is certainly an embarassing result for social conservatives, but it's not so clear what should be done about it. After all, if the study had shown that the Conservative Party had been hurt by its opposition to gay marriage, the solution, from an electoral point of view, would have been straightforward: drop the opposition to gay marriage. But the problem is rather that many social liberals simply believe that the Conservative Party is up to no good, independently of its official positions on social issues. It is easier to address a problem in the realm of policies, which can be argued about with facts and logic, than in the realm of fundamental beliefs and values, where instincts and feelings play a larger role. The common Liberal charge of a Conservative "hidden agenda" falls clearly in the realm of emotions and not of rationality, because this charge is impossible to falsify: you cannot prove that you do not have a hidden agenda. The difficulties in overcoming the reluctance of social liberals can be illustrated by another historical difficulty faced by the Conservative Party: the reluctance of Quebecers to vote Conservative since the First World War. As historian Claude Bélanger points out, in the decades following the First World War: [T]he Conservative party appeared foreign, as "le parti des Anglais", pro business, imperialist, opposing all the symbols of nationhood, including the flag that Quebecers seemed to support. Their leaders were perceived as not so open and tolerant, and caring very little about Quebec. Except for Diefenbaker's landslide victory in 1958, the Conservatives have had pretty dismal results in Québec in these decades. Diefenbaker's breakthrough was short-lived and evaporated in the 1962 and 1963 elections. In 1965, with the Conservatives in the opposition, Léon Balcer, who was considered Diefenbaker's Québec lieutenant, broke ranks with his leader and voted with the Liberal government in favour of a new Canadian flag. Shortly after, Balcer quit federal politics and declared that "there is no place for a French Canadian in the party of Mr. Diefenbaker." Diefenbaker's successor as Conservative leader, Robert Stanfield, worked hard to reach out to Quebecers. He declared his support for the Official Languages Act and for bilingualism. In 1974, he blocked the nomination of anti-bilingualism Moncton mayor Leonard Jones who would otherwise have been a Conservative candidate. Stanfield also endorsed the Deux Nations thesis of Canada, which considered Québec as a distinct nation within Canada. When Stanfield died in 2003, Québec Premier Jean Charest called him a "friend of Québec". When Joe Clark replaced Robert Stanfield as Conservative leader in 1976, he continued to follow his predecessor's example. Historian Claude Bélanger says that "[o]nly when Robert Stanfield, and later Joseph Clark, became leaders of the Conservative party did the party start to make inroads into the hearts and minds of the Quebec people." But these inroads did not produce better electoral results: in 4 elections from 1972 to 1980, the Conservatives won an average of only 2 seats in Québec. Thus, in the 1983 race for the Conservative leadership, Brian Mulroney could point out that the problem of the Conservatives was still that it could not win more than a half-dozen out of the 100 ridings in Canada where the mother tongue of at least 15% of the voting population is French. Stanfield's and Clark's strategy finally paid off in 1984, 17 years after Stanfield became Conservative leader, when Mulroney won 58 seats in Québec. The biggest change in 1984 was not in Conservative policies, it was that the Conservatives were led by a charismatic French-speaking Quebecer, whom French Canadians could trust and connect with on an emotional level. It could be said that the Conservatives have missed a golden oppurtunity during the 2004 leadership race, when the image of the re-founded party was still in flux. The Conservative Party could have chosen Belinda Stronach, a socially liberal woman, as its leader. This probably would have given the Conservative Party a quite different image and would have erased much of the four-points social conservatism penalty. However, it must be pointed out that the Conservative Party does not suffer from the Canadian Alliance's gender gap which, according to the paper on the Canadian Election Study, "suggests that the Conservatives succeeded in establishing a more moderate image" than the Canadian Alliance. | Il y a un sempiternel débat parmi les conservateurs Canadiens sur le genre de stratégie électorale dont devrait user le Parti Conservateur. Les libertariens et ceux qui sont fiscalement conservateurs mais socialement libéraux affirment souvent que le conservatisme social nuit au Parti Conservateur et que le parti devrait généralement abandonner tout objectif socialement conservateur et plutôt projeter une image socialement libérale. Dans certains cas extrêmes, ils affirment même que la seule chose qui empêche le Parti Conservateur de prendre le pouvoir est qu'il n'a pas déjà abandonné son conservatisme social.
Les socio-conservateurs défendent évidemment leur conservatisme social et nient qu'il nuit électoralement au Parti Conservateur. Certains affirment même qu'il existe au Canada une majorité silencieuse socialement conservatrice qui attend seulement que le Parti Conservateur adopte un agenda explicitement socialement conservateur pour le porter au pouvoir. Aussi, ils affirment souvent que le conservatisme social est la clé qui va permettre de gagner la faveur du nombre croissant de minorités ethniques du Canada. Pour faire la lumière sur ce débat, je vais examiner les données de l'Étude électorale canadienne de 2004, telle qu'analysée par cinq professeurs de science politique dans un articlé présenté au congrès annuel 2005 de l'Association canadienne de science politique. Il faut souligner que cet article analyse exclusivement le paysage politique hors Québec. Étant donné que la question du souverainisme-versus-fédéralisme domine toujours le paysage politique québécois, celui-ci aurait necessité un article à lui tout seul. Les données pertinentes de l'Étude électorale canadienne ont été recueillies sur deux plans différents: dans le premier plan, on questionnait les répondants sur leurs valeurs et croyances fondamentales alors que dans le second plan on leur demandait leur opinion sur des politiques spécifiques. Ainsi, l'étude a construit un index — s'appuyant sur des questions portant sur les sentiments à l'égard des gais, des lesbiennes, des féministes et du rôle des femmes — pour déterminer jusqu'à quel point une personne adhère à des valeurs socialement conservatrices. Ensuite, on a questionné les répondants sur leur opinion à propos d'enjeux politiques précis comme l'avortement et le mariage gai. Les résultats de l'étude liés au conservatisme social sont à la fois intéressants et intriguants. D'abord, "l'avortment n'a tout simplement pas été un facteur important dans le choix d'un parti par les électeurs" et "l'enjeu des mariages de même sexe n'a eu aucun impact sur la part du vote Conservateur", ce qui signifie qu'aucun enjeu socialement conservateur en particulier n'a nui au Parti Conservateur. Par contre, les électeurs socialement libéraux étaient réticents à voter pour les Conservateurs, ce qui a eu un impact négatif considérable sur les performances électorales du parti: Globalement, les opinions socialement libérales prédominent: la moitié de l'échantillon a eu un score inférieur à -.25 sur l'échelle de conservatisme social (qui allait de -1 à +1). Pour mieux comprendre que ces chiffres signifient, jetons un coup d'oeil sur les résultats officiels des élections de 2004. Sur 10 126 447 votes exprimés hors Québec, 3 717 959 l'ont été pour le Parti Conservateur et 3 816 575 l'ont été pour le Parti Libéral. En d'autres mots, les Conservateurs ont gagné 36,7% du vote hors Québec alors que Libéraux en ont gagné 37,7%. En l'absence du facteur du conservatisme social, les Conservateurs auraient gagné plus de 40% du vote hors Québec, plus que les Libéraux. C'est certainement un résultat embarrassant pour les socio-conservateurs, mais ce qu'on doit en faire est loin d'être clair. Après tout, si l'étude avait montré que son opposition au mariage gai avait nui au Parti Conservateur, la solution, d'un point de vue électoral, aurait été toute simple: laisser tomber l'opposition au mariage gai. Mais le problème est plutôt que trop de socio-libéraux croient tout simplement que le Parti Conservateur prépare des mauvais coups, indépendamment de ses positions officielles sur les enjeux sociaux. Il est plus facile de régler un problème dans le domaine des politiques, desquelles on peut discuter à l'aide de faits et de logique, que dans le domaine des croyances et valeurs fondamentales, où les instincts et les sentiments jouent un plus grand rôle. L'attaque Libérale fréquente à propos d'un "agenda caché" Conservateur se trouve clairement dans le domaine des émotions et non de la raison, parce que cette attaque est impossible à falsifier: vous ne pouvez pas prouver que vous n'avez pas d'agenda caché. Les difficultés à briser les réticences des socio-libéraux peuvent être illustrées par une autre difficulté historique à laquelle le Parti Conservateur a dû faire face: la réticence des Québécois à voter Conservateur depuis la Première guerre mondiale. Comme l'historien Claude Bélanger le souligne, dans les décennies suivant la Première guerre mondiale: Le Parti Conservateur semblait être étranger, "le parti des Anglais", pro-entreprises, impérialiste, s'opposant à tout symbole national canadien, incluant le drapeau que les Québécois semblaient appuyer. Leurs chefs étaient vus comme n'étant pas tellement ouverts et tolérants et se souciant très peu du Québec. Excepté pour la victoire écrasante de Diefenbaker en 1958, les Conservateurs ont eu des résultats plutôt désastreux au Québec durant ces décennies. La percée de Diefenbaker a été de courte durée et s'est évaporée lors des élections de 1962 et 1963. En 1965, avec les Conservateurs dans l'opposition, Léon Balcer, qui était considéré comme le lieutenant québécois de Diefenbaker, s'est opposé à son chef et a voté avec le gouvernement Libéral en faveur d'un nouveau drapeau canadien. Peu après, Balcer a quitté la politique fédérale et a déclaré que: "il n'y a pas de place pour un Canadien français dans le parti de M. Diefenbaker." Le successeur de Diefenbaker comme chef Conservateur, Robert Stanfield, a trimé dur pour gagner la faveur des Québécois. Il s'est déclaré en faveur de la Loi sur les langues officielles et du bilinguisme. En 1974, il a refusé la nomination du maire anti-bilinguisme de Moncton, Leonard Jones, qui sinon aurait été un candidat Conservateur. Stanfield a aussi appuyé la thèse des deux nations selon laquelle le Québec est une nation distincte à l'intérieur du Canada. Lorsque Stanfield est mort en 2003, le premier ministre du Québec Jean Charest l'a appelé un "ami du Québec". Lorsque Joe Clark a remplacé Robert Stanfield comme chef Conservateur en 1976, il a continué à suivre l'exemple de son prédécesseur. L'historien Claude Bélanger écrit que "c'est seulement lorsque Robert Stanfield, et plus tard Joseph Clark, sont devenus chefs du Parti Conservateur que le parti a commencé à faire des percées dans les coeurs et les esprits du peuple québécois." Mais ces percées n'ont pas produit de meilleurs résultats électoraux: lors de 4 élections de 1972 à 1980, les Conservateurs ont gagné une moyenne de seulement 2 sièges au Québec. Ainsi, dans la course de 1983 à la chefferie du Parti Conservateur, Brian Mulroney a pu souligner que le problème des Conservateurs restait qu'ils n'arrivaient pas à gagner plus d'une demi-douzaine de sièges parmi les 100 circonscriptions où la langue maternelle d'au moins 15% des électeurs est le français. La stratégie de Stanfield et Clark a finalement donné des résultats en 1984, 17 ans après que Stanfield soit devenu chef Conservateur, lorsque Mulroney a gagné 58 sièges au Québec. Le plus grand changement en 1984 ne se trouvait pas dans les politiques Conservatrices, c'était plutôt que les Conservateurs étaient menés par un Québécois francophone charismatique, avec lequel les Canadiens français pouvaient avoir une relation de confiance et une connexion au niveau émotif. On pourrait dire que les Conservateurs ont raté une occasion en or durant la course à la chefferie de 2004, alors que l'image du parti re-fondé était encore en mouvement. Le Parti Conservateur aurait pu choisir Belinda Stronach, un femme socialement libérale, en tant que chef. Cela aurait probablement donné au Parti Conservateur une image bien différente et aurait effacé une bonne partie de la pénalité de quatre points liée au conservatisme social. Cependant, il faut souligner que le Parti Conservateur ne souffre pas de l'écart des sexes de l'Alliance canadienne, ce qui, selon l'article sur l'Étude électorale canadienne, "suggère que les Conservateurs ont réussi à établir une image plus modérée" que l'Alliance canadienne. |
If Stanfield was a friend of Quebec why did he receive so little support from the electorate? Trudeau's 72 campaign was salvaged by Quebec. Without that support he would have lost badly and the whole history of Canada changes.
The analysis weakens, WADR, when regional support is examined. The Maritimes and Ontario all supported the Libs with the lowest percentage in NS at 40%. A small percentage gain from parachuting SC from the platform means little. However, is it social conservatives who are the problem or is it the fiscal conservatives that fundamentally are alien? If the CPC fiscal policy tacked to the left of the Libs (ala David Orchard) how does that impact upon the vote?
Écrit par: Charles à septembre 14, 2005 02:20 PMCharles,
The point is precisely that the image of a party can have an electoral impact independent of that of its policies. Stanfield did adopt Québec-friendly and francophone-friendly policy positions. But most voters do not bother reading - or take with a grain of salt - policy documents, electoral platforms and political speeches. The perception lingered on that the Conservative Party was le parti des Anglais and only an exceptional event, like a French-speaking Quebecer becoming the Conservative leader, was enough to break that perception.
Similarly, parachuting social conservatism from the platform means little not because four extra points of support would be meaningless but because there is little social conservatism in the Conservative platform and, to the extent that there is (opposition to gay marriage), I pointed out in this post that it didn't hurt the Conservatives. What did hurt the Conservatives was distrust from social liberals and its image as the party of social conservatism. The potency of the "hidden agenda" charge and its ability to override whatever official policy position the Conservative Party may adopt illustrates that this problem is not merely about policies or platforms.
Finally, you ask whether fiscal or social conservatism is the problem. This is a good question, but it is possible that the answer is "both". In fact, I will post in the coming days about the impact of fiscal conservatism on Conservative fortunes.
Écrit par: Laurent à septembre 14, 2005 10:23 PMVery interesting, Laurent.
In summary, image instead of policy for Canada. The English party wins in Quebec if a favorite son leads. The CPC social policy is not particularly conservative. It may be both social and fiscal policy, that proves a detriment, or to embellish this line of thought, it could be neither.
Some anomalies - the English party forms a minority gov't in '57, essentially because of Ontario. The common wisdom suggests Duplessis swings Quebec. In less than a year? MD, by all acounts was a very influential man, however, that much of a swing in one year? Or is it that Dief in '58 faces an Anglo, Pearson, instead of St. Laurent. Interestingly, Dief wins in '58 even discounting Quebec. In '84, Mulroney, a favorite son, even though an Anglo, wins overwhelmingly in Quebec. However, he also faced an Anglo, Turner. Again, the PCs would have been elected even w/o support from Quebec (however, not so overwhelmingly). It supports some old chatter, that even if Crosby, a unilingual Anglo was nominated, the English Party still gets elected again, essentially because of Ontario.
In 2004, the English Party faces an Anglo, in a severely divided Quebec, and should have won in a walk, but can't do it, because Ontario does not swing. Why? Demographics? (You have written extensively on that subject).
My Hindu-Canadian customs agent (he lives in Toronto) said before the election in 04, (again image as you suggest), the CPC were the party that wanted to deport him (i.e. visible minorities). He said it in a humorous fashion, but still?
Now he is talking differently. He remarked that the white people had left his neighbourhood. His community was more and more resembling Bangladesh(sp?), at least demographically. He feels, this gov't is creating an underclass. Wages and benefits are in decline. Poverty is increasing. A notion confirmed by Stats Canada.
Anecdotally, in was an interesting conservation.
Great analysis Laurent! For Claude Bélanger to say that Stanfield and Clark made inroads in Quebec is a farce! Clark won 2 seats in 1979 and only one in 1980, both of which had nothing to do with Clark. Heward Grafftey in Brome-Mississquo had been MP since the 1950s and Roch LaSalle in Joliette was personally popular.
Écrit par: Adam Daifallah à septembre 15, 2005 04:26 PMThe hidden agenda argument works for the Liberals simply because the CPC cannot seem to come up with a principled stance on the various issues which the Charter has and will create. Gay marriage could have been approached by the Tories as a wedge to attack the Liberals' hidden agenda on immigration, working parents and aboriginial rights.
The problem with such attacks is that, initially, they would be seen by the highly political Canadian media as regressive and the Conservatives would be called bigots and worse.
So, instead, the CPC has straddled the fence on both social and fiscal issues trying to close any gaps between its policies and the Liberal Party's. This has lead to a fatal "me tooism" an a complete inability to find issues with which the CPC might win.
Which, sadly, means that the Liberals will likely win the next election and may even be able to achieve a majority if they bang the "mandate" drum loudly enough. This because the CPC cannot decide if it is fish or fowl and meanders along hoping no one will notice. It is not a strategy which is working.
Écrit par: Jay Currie à septembre 16, 2005 04:12 AM