UN boss urged Plan B on Chrétien
Take hard line on separatism: leaders. Spanish PM also offered advice on how to quell threats to break up the country
Bill Curry
The Gazette (Montreal)
Monday, November 24, 2003
Former United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali and several other world leaders were behind Jean Chrétien's controversial "Plan B" approach to Quebec separatism, according to a new biography of the outgoing prime minister.
Following the razor-thin victory for the "No" side in the 1995 referendum on Quebec sovereignty, Chrétien rejected the advice of most Canadian leaders by approving a tough-love strategy toward his home province.
The plan included the appointment of sharp-tongued political scientist Stéphane Dion to cabinet, referring the legality of Quebec separation to the Supreme Court, and ultimately the passing of the Clarity Act.
In November 1995, Chrétien was under pressure to implement the last-minute promises he had made in the final week of the campaign, including constitutional recognition of Quebec as a distinct society and granting it a veto power over constitutional amendments.
Shortly after the referendum, Chrétien had to leave the country to attend the funeral of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who had been assassinated.
After Israel, Chrétien travelled to New Zealand for a meeting of the Commonwealth and to Japan for a meeting of APEC.
According to Chrétien: Un Canadien Pure Laine by veteran political columnist Michel Vastel, during that two-week tour the PM was bombarded with questions from more than 30 world leaders who were shocked by the closeness of the referendum vote, which had been broadcast live around the world on CNN.
The two leaders who had the strongest impact on Chrétien, the book said, were Ghali and Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez, whose country has its own Basque separatist group.
"What are you afraid of? We take care of our separatists," Gonzalez is quoted as telling Chrétien.
Gonzalez was dogged by controversy throughout his rule for the hard line his government took with Basque separatists, but always denied allegations that his ruling Socialist Party organized death squads.
Ghali, an Egyptian, is also depicted as giving Chrétien a stern warning. "How could you have let that happen? If you accept secessions as easily as that, we will have 500 new states and the world will be impossible to govern," he is quoted as saying.
Marcel Massé, federal minister responsible for Quebec at the time, is quoted as saying: "When he returned from that two-week trip, the prime minister no longer had the same sense of urgency as us. It was as if there was a time lag between him and us."
Massé states that Chrétien told his cabinet the rest of the world did not think the Canadian government should panic and make concessions. He then said several world leaders told him it was time to fight back.
Massé further reveals that, contrary to public statements, the federal government did have a plan in the event of a win by the "Yes" forces in the referendum.
Jocelyne Bourgon, clerk of the Privy Council at the time and head of the public service, developed a response to four possible scenarios based on sovereignty votes of 40 per cent, 45 per cent, 50 per cent and 55 per cent.
The final result Oct. 30, 1995, was 50.58 per cent for the No and 49.42 per cent for the Yes side.
Massé explained the most likely federal response to a slim Yes victory would have been to effectively ignore the result.
"The federal government had nothing to lose because, with each action taken by the provincial government - and we had prepared for an entire series of possible actions - we would reply with another action of the same sort and of equal importance," said Massé. "We knew we had a stronger hand to play than the Parti Québécois: the strategy of inertia was clearly the best."